MR Insights

# OPORDs and Leadership: Complicating Simplicity

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*The only new thing in the world is the history you don't know.*
—Harry S. Truman[1]

Something remarkable occurred (by today's military standards) just before Operation Market Garden during World War II. British Army Lieutenant General B.G. Horrocks stood before his commanders and, using a map, briefed them on the operations order (OPORD). The XXX Corps commander articulated the mission, defined its primary and intermediate objectives, assigned tasks to subordinates and, using an analogy to American Westerns, explained the concept of the operation. In just under 10 minutes, Horrocks had issued orders for the ground phase of the largest airborne operation in the history of warfare.

When preparing to retake Cyrenaica in North Africa during World War II, German Field Marshal Erwin Rommel published a 21-paragraph OPORD with "each paragraph, on average, containing only seven lines of typescript."[2] In 8 days Rommel pushed the British back to Gazala and regained the initiative in North Africa. Five months later he took Tobruk.[3] No hint exists that Rommel's commanders lacked crucial information or failed to understand the mission, the concept of operation, or essential tasks.

## Orders: Publish or Perish

Prussian military strategist Carl von Clausewitz describes war as supremely simple.[4] Today's masters of operational and strategic arts believe information proliferation, technological advances, and the urban battlefield have created an asymmetrical threat that changes the nature of warfare. Such a threat, they claim, is much too complex to defeat without PowerPoint™ briefings; information operations (IO) themes and messages; effects-based operations; endless meetings; lengthy, overly detailed OPORDs; and command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR). Historian Victor Davis Hanson compares this notion to a water pump, warning that no matter how advanced a water pump becomes, it does not bring forth a novel liquid.[5]

The U.S. Army's principles of war (objective, offense, mass, economy of force, maneuver, unity of command, security, surprise, and *simplicity*) are essential to success in combat but apparently lack the nuance and political sensitivity deemed essential to the police actions of nationbuilding.

Military force is a blunt instrument. Policymakers should embrace this reality rather than radically alter traditional, battle-proven military structures. Clausewitz reminds us: "[T]he soldier is levied, clothed, armed, and trained—he sleeps, eats, drinks, marches—merely to fight at the right place and the right time."[6] Soldiers are not policemen. Armies are not police forces.

For its part, the U.S. Army needs to simplify its methods, reduce its staffs, shift leadership paradigms, and transform in the right rather than the wrong places. The nature of warfare has not changed, even in this era of nationbuilding. Success in battle, whether in high- or low-intensity conflict, still hinges on the principles of war. Instead of a facelift through a force-restructuring scheme akin to robbing Peter to pay Paul, the Army needs to lose weight by changing how it does business and by returning to battle-proven methods and organizational and leadership principles.

Before redeploying for Operation Iraqi Freedom, V Corps suffered a 50 percent turnover in staff. Key positions from the corps commander, chief of staff, deputy chief of operations, and deputy chief of plans and exercises as well as the G-staff primaries and secondaries were filled by new officers only weeks before V Corps' mission rehearsal exercise (MRX) and mere months before deployment. These officers did not participate in the train-up for the MRX and received only a few weeks training during the MRX to become familiar with the corps' standing operating procedures (SOPs) and their functions, which is not the best way to create a cohesive team able to react efficiently to the commander's will.

Aside from the problems in continuity such turnover causes, consider the staff's size as V Corps expanded into Multinational Corps-Iraq (MNC-I), then imagine the volume of paper and briefs these organizations produced. About 120 officers were on the V Corps staff, 200 were on the MNC-I staff, and hundreds of noncommissioned officers and soldiers augmented and supported them.

What the staffs lacked in efficiency because of their size, they made up for in the volume of orders and briefs they produced. Within a year V Corps produced 4 OPORDs and over 500 fragmentary orders (FRAGOs), averaging 60 pages per OPORD and 4 pages per FRAGO (for a total of 2,000 pages)—just for training exercises and unit deployments—and hundreds of PowerPoint™ slides for briefing after briefing. MNC-I recently published an 82-page effects-based OPORD with attached annexes running into the hundreds of pages.

All this activity demonstrates a publish-or-perish mentality that epitomizes Parkinson's Law: Work

expands so as to fill the time available for its completion. Thousands of man-hours go into producing lengthy documents with details ad nauseum. Such documents are ignored or, if read, either overwhelm subordinates or confuse them and, in any case, fall by the wayside when the first shot is fired. It is one of the marvels of the Information Age that Army generals are concerning themselves with innumerable "eaches, theses, and thats" of unit structure and operations.

By comparison, locked into position for a year during the extensive train-up in England before Operation Overlord began, the V Corps staff produced half the paperwork the MNC-I V Corps staff produced. The number of soldiers without two pairs of boots in 1st Squad, 1st Platoon, A Company, 1-16th Infantry, 1st Infantry Division, was not a war-stopper issue worthy of the corps commander's attention. Which organization, V Corps then or V Corps now, was more prepared, efficient, and cohesive?

## Other Voices, Other Armies

Consider the command and staff relationships other professional armies practiced in combat. Rommel biographer David Fraser notes: "The Germans traditionally believed staffs should be formed as self-sufficient cells, with individuals understanding each other's methods and requirements, able to respond to battle and the commander's will in battle like a brain and a nervous system."[7] The emphasis was on developing well-trained, integrated staffs that, when preserved as units, were familiar with their commanders' abilities and leadership styles.[8]

Because of its training and continuity, a small, specialized staff can efficiently process and analyze reports, glean critical information for the commander's use, manage logistics and communications to support his orders, and keep subordinate commanders apprised of the battlefield situation. A specialized staff, by its nature, brings together expertise. If a chief of staff or executive officer with a broad appreciation of the tactical or strategic picture manages that expertise, the staff can focus on coordinating the battlespace and maintaining logistical support.

Fraser notes: "[The Wehrmacht] rejected both the principle and practice of over-detailed orders," considering it a mistake for a staff to plan operations in detail because a staff often does not have the most up-to-date, relevant information about unit readiness and capability or fully appreciate the actual conditions on the ground.[9]

How often do subordinate commanders brief a status different from the staff picture? How often do subordinate commands report an enemy situation different from that of the G2's? The Germans believed a commander "should be given the simplest of instructions and objectives and be set free to discharge his mission as appears to him best," which put the emphasis on the commander executing his mission based on firsthand knowledge of his unit and the current situation, not on speculation from on high as to enemy intentions or on inaccurate status reports.[10]

The staff worked diligently in the background to meet support requirements as the battle developed. The Wehrmacht spent little time fretting over logistics, speculating about enemy courses of action, or developing detailed schemes of maneuver for plans that would not survive contact.[11] Instead, it emphasized engaging the enemy at the level where the real fighting occurs and massing combat power at the decisive point to accomplish the mission. Clausewitz observes that plans and orders change as soon as fighting begins, and success in battle depends solely on the commander's talent.[12] Napoleon is more succinct: "The art of war is simple; everything is a matter of execution."[13] No one reasons. Everyone executes.

The following vignette illustrates Napoleon's maxim. Marshal Michel Ney complained to Napoleon that Napoleon's staff was swamping him with paperwork. Ney asked Napoleon, "What do you want? Answers to the endless inquiries of your staff or for me to execute your orders?" Napoleon told Ney to concern himself only with his orders and put away the staff correspondence for a month. At month's end, Ney cracked the seals on the staff correspondence, opened and read the letters, and when directives were not overcome by events, he answered the mail. Ney never responded again to lengthy staff inquiries.

The Grande Armée and the Wehrmacht were not the only armies to adopt such practices. In the U.S. Army's 4th Armored Division (the spearhead of General George Patton's Third Army) the staff SOP directed that no OPORD exceed one page. If needed, a map could be drawn on the back of that one page. This illustrates an axiom attributed to Patton: "Don't tell people how to do things. Tell them what to do, and let them surprise you with their results."[14] Patton took only one operations and intelligence briefing a day while on campaign in the European Theater of Operations (ETO). The briefing lasted no more than 45 minutes, and then Patton was off to the front.

If Patton is too much of a renegade to emulate in command and staff methods, consider VII Corps Major General J. Lawton "Lighting Joe" Collins. His Order 18 (to expand the Remagen Bridgehead and attack into the industrial heartland of Germany) was only 4 pages long with 3 short annexes: an operations overlay, an intelligence annex, and a fire-support annex. The 1997 draft of Field Manual 101-5, *Command and Control for Commanders and Staffs*, states: "Especially notable is the brevity and simplicity of the basic order. Such simplicity and brevity reflect the combat-tested experience and SOPs of VII Corps and the divisions within First U.S. Army."[15] Of course, such brevity and simplicity require the commander to be at the front assessing the situation for himself and acting according to his skill and judgment.

Contrast these orders and command practices with those of stability operations and support operations (SOSO) in Iraq. For one specific SOSO task, such as targeting, the staff produces dozens of slides (linked to voluminous target folders) for use in targeting boards and coordination meetings resulting in multiple-page FRAGOs that direct operations against a single target. Supposedly major combat operations are far less complex than SOSO, especially within the coalition environment, so the commander needs real-time feeds, information

dominance, and civil-military affairs savvy. Perhaps. The perceived requirements were no different for commanders during the occupation of Germany, but the plan for Operation Eclipse was concise (two phases, with a mere five objectives in Phase II, and not a single slide detailing execution).[16] How such simple plans and staff work ever pacified a nation of 60 million, kept the trains running on time, the lights on, the people fed, and the sewage treatment plants operating is hard to imagine, but they did.

The reconstruction of postwar Germany and its governance within a coalition framework (with one power decidedly hostile to the interests of the United States and England, and I am not referring to the French) seems every bit as complex as nationbuilding in Iraq, a country with one-third the population. How could a military with no satellite communications, tactical local area network, or unmanned aerial vehicles, and with virtually no C4ISR capabilities, publish simple orders for complex operations with nothing close to the information dominance enjoyed by today's forces in Iraq? One would think the relationship inverse.

## Managers and Numbers

When a military develops a corporate mentality, the name of the game is no longer leadership, it is management—a fatal shift. Herein lies the rub. Only numbers matter to a manager. Numbers are manageable. If we can reduce a problem to numbers, then we can put the problem into a computer and derive a solution quickly and efficiently. Therefore, managers place great emphasis on measures of effectiveness and performance. Working groups meet to massage the numbers, lengthy briefs explain the numbers, and detailed orders disseminate the numbers.

SOSO revolve around numbers. If 20 Iraqis join the Iraqi National Guard today, 10 tomorrow, and 5 the next day, Iraqis must lack confidence in the Iraqi Security Forces. If 5 sheiks today, 10 tomorrow, and 20 the next day roll over on insurgents, local support for the insurgency is declining. If a majority of Iraqis surveyed say they have confidence in the constitutional process, then the IO themes and messages are working. There is no limit to the spin we can put on numbers. At the rate operations are managed in Iraq, it is not surprising to see the resurrection of something akin to the Vietnam-era Hamlet Evaluation Survey (HES).[17] If nothing else, the HES made pacification efforts quantifiable, Vietnamization manageable. Still, despite the glossy numbers, the plan was a total failure. One glance at the MNC-I's 180-slide "Effects Assessment Board" gives one the sinking feeling that history is repeating itself.

The U.S. Army is fighting an insurgency—regardless of the euphemistic terms we attach to it. Corporate suits require management with the veneer of leadership; warriors require leadership with only the veneer of management. Armies engaged in combat operations need real leadership. Rear Admiral Grace Hopper reminds us no one ever managed men into battle.[18] The litany of boards, bureaus, centers, cells, and working groups that dominate SOSO briefs might make the counterinsurgency fight manageable, but they offer little in the way of a quick, decisive, lasting victory. Only someone with a genius for war can produce such results. Napoleon asserts: "In war, men are nothing; one man is everything."[19]

Groupthink and bureaucracy do not encourage original ideas or reward innovation. Historian Hugh Nibley, a veteran of Normandy, finds management feeds on mediocrity, and no manager is about to promote anyone whose competence threatens his own position.[20] Nibley notes that for a hundred years the German Generalstab desperately tried to train leaders for the German Army, "but it never worked, because the men who delighted their superiors; that is, the managers, got the high commands, while the men who delighted the lower ranks; that is, the leaders, got reprimands."[21] It is no wonder that 60 years later Master of Public Administration programs hail Max Weber, a bureaucrat, for his administrative acuity and ignore Rommel, one of the Great Captains, despite his battle-tested leadership. The U.S. Army embraces the management practices espoused in the Nation's leading universities and corporations and shuns Rommel and Patton in its training courses. For an officer to emulate Patton in today's Army guarantees at least a reprimand, if not a short career.

No one is more attuned to the shifting winds of office politics than the manager, in whose view the problem is always complex and in need of the nuances of management. The solution is to be found within the lines through regulations, flowcharts, and working groups—all of which require the manager's rigid oversight in order to arrive at a "right" (politically acceptable and, therefore, safe) solution—a solution that only suffices until the next crisis or meeting. The manager reacts to all things and averts none.

## Caesar and Patton

By contrast, observes Nibley, leadership is an escape from mediocrity.[22] To a true leader, a problem is never too complex and the solution is simple. Leaders retain the initiative. Julius Caesar was never disconcerted; he always knew exactly what to do, and did it. Gallic chieftains fomenting rebellion? Hunt them down and kill them. Gauls foolish enough to have joined the warlords and taken up arms against Caesar's legions? Lop off their hands.[23] Now *there* was an IO campaign! Caesar came, saw, conquered. To the agitators, death; to the populace, resistance is unsustainable. Gaul is pacified, absorbed into the Empire, and prospers, never to threaten Rome again. Ironically, for this achievement the Roman Senate denounced Caesar as a criminal.

So that we would not mistake his actions for wanton brutality, Caesar explains that he "knew his leniency was universally known, and so he was not afraid that if he acted somewhat harshly he would appear to have done so out of any innate cruelty. . . . For this reason he decided upon making an example of the townspeople in punishing them, so as to deter the rest. He allowed them to live, therefore, but cut off the hands of all those who had carried arms against him. This made the punishment for wrongdoers plain to see."[24]

In addition to making an example out of the insurgents, Caesar

deprived them of the means to resist: he broke their will. He knew he could kill them until he rotted and get nowhere, but if he attacked their will to fight, he could break the resistance (and did). Of course, CNN was not present to broadcast such deeds into the living rooms of every Roman and Gaul. Today, the screams of Soccer Moms, college professors, the American Civil Liberties Union, and Europeans would be unbearable. So even if the sensibilities of most Americans were not greatly offended by such Draconian measures, we would be made to feel that they had been. In fact, lopping off hands is not an unusual punishment in the Arab world where thieves suffer this fate as rote justice. The howl from the Arab street would presumably only be outrage at infidels doing the deed rather than their own oppressive regimes.

If Caesar's remedy to insurgency was a bit Draconian, consider what the U.S. Army did with the Germans after World War II. When martial law was declared, two simple rules applied to every German: surrender all firearms or suffer the pain of death; violate curfew and suffer the pain of death.[25] The official U.S. Army history of the occupation of Germany notes: "The army-type occupation was comprehensive and showed the Germans that they were defeated and their country occupied."[26] Germany was pacified. Such a simple solution to such a complex problem could only be the product of leaders not overly concerned with domestic politics, world opinion, or the Aryan street, the 1945 equivalent of today's Arab street.

Comparing leaders and managers, Nibley observes that "leaders are movers and shakers, original, inventive, unpredictable, imaginative, and full of surprises that discomfit the enemy in war and the main office in peace, [and] managers are safe, conservative, predictable, conforming organization men and team players, dedicated to the establishment."[27]

Leaders are also practical-minded, politically incorrect, and not afraid to do what is necessary on their own initiative when circumstances dictate. Caesar conquers Gaul because he must. If Rome is afraid, consumed by petty politics, and indecisive, Caesar is not. Patton directs his commanders to attack toward Bastogne. If Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force is disconcerted by Adolph Hitler's Ardennes counteroffensive, Patton is not. Who else other than Patton was practical-minded enough to employ Nazis to keep the railroads running and the sewage systems operating during the occupation of Germany? If Washington is consumed by hubris over de-Nazification, Patton is not. Would any general today harangue his troops as "sons of bitches" or contravene orders from Washington during politically sensitive SOSO?

To some it appears baffling that the crass, chauvinistic Patton, who led an army to victory over Nazi Germany, and considered himself morally superior to such an enemy, became an effective administrator of postwar Germany. Today's Army is not that of 1944, and it shows. To act as Patton did would be to commit career suicide, which is unthinkable for a manager who defines achievement as advancement and believes the best way to advance is to play it safe.

Vision is a dangerous thing to management. Visionaries rock the boat. "True leaders are inspiring," explains Nibley, "because they are inspired, caught up in a higher purpose."[28] Whether that purpose is just or not, or right or wrong, suffice it to say that such a leader is idealistic and driven—sometimes by a belief in destiny. Why else would Patton, as biographer Carlo D'Este notes, tromp around the backroads of Normandy while on leave from the front in World War I believing one day he would lead armored forces in a mighty and desperate struggle through that very terrain?[29]

Not long ago, a retired Army Chief of Staff, touring the Gettysburg battlefield, appeared on PBS *Frontline Reports* and drew the conclusion that the Army must transform into a more agile, lighter force.[30] There are many lessons to draw from Gettysburg, but the need for a transformation from heavy, tracked armor to light, wheeled armor capable of rapid deployment by air transport is not one of them. Besides drawing inspiration from the wrong battle in the wrong war from this wrong era, the "revelation" is not inspiring. True leaders might be egotistical, even delusional, but they have a sense of purpose and they instill that purpose in others without using erroneous historical contexts.

Two decades after his reconnaissance of northern France, Patton led an army across France and into the heart of Germany, engaging more enemy units, killing more Germans, and advancing farther and faster than any other army in the ETO. Europe is free from Nazi tyranny, and generations of Americans live in freedom thanks to Patton's military prowess. Greatness is not the product of a hypercompetitive corporate culture or "effects-assessment" metrics. Leadership is synonymous with achievement.

And so we return to where we began—to General Horrocks—a commander standing before his men, issuing his orders. Adroit observers of history note that before Operation Market Garden the British Army was caught up in laboriously producing detailed orders, but the rapid pace of mechanized and airborne warfare (two truly revolutionary developments in the history of war) overcame British staff practices. The British adapted to the requirements of modern warfare, a change that, combined with sound leadership, made the objective clear. An imperfect plan executed violently now is better than a perfect plan executed too late.

## War and the Water Pump

What we are doing is not novel. We just think it is. No matter how advanced our war machine gets, water still comes out of the water pump. The principles that govern war do not change by virtue of technology.

Not to belabor a point, but if the Third Army of 1944 had time-warped into Iraq to conduct Operation Iraqi Freedom, it could have defeated Saddam's army, and done so just as quickly as today's much more technologically advanced forces. The simple truth is that in the 60 years since World War II there has been no revolution in warfare. The air and tank attack tactics the Germans pioneered remain in use today; all we have done is perfect them.

Because of technology, modern

warfare is more lethal, not revolutionized, as it was by the machine-gun, the airplane, and the tank. We have come a long way from using the club as a weapon. By using nuclear weapons, we have reached a pinnacle in the ability to slaughter each other. Perhaps, we do not need to find yet another technological advance or organizational structure or tactical formation to revolutionize war. Clausewitz reminds us that the rapid, uninterrupted advance to a decisive conclusion is the aim of all combat operations. No conquest can be over too soon, so perhaps getting to a fight quickly is less important than winning the fight quickly once in it.

Clausewitz also says war is not an isolated event. War does not break out suddenly without warning. Indicators are always present.[31] We must be willing to acknowledge them. Because we have become too politically correct, we either dismiss what does not fit our preconceived notions, wish away bad news, or simply cannot handle the truth.

We stood by idly as the Nazi war machine steamrolled across Europe, North Africa, and the Russian steppes. The Japanese hopped from island to island in the Pacific and then took much of the Pacific Rim. We stood by until attacked, despite the indicators. Having foresight is not an American virtue, but innovation is. Hopefully, men capable of rising to the occasion—leaders like Patton—will be standing in the wings and will not have been driven out of our Army when we really need them to fight and win wars against a formidable conventional enemy we have wished away or claim does not exist.

We must get out of the weeds of management and return to battle-proven methods and leadership that prepare us to fight against modern, professional armies instead of praising ourselves for running over some rag-bag Arab army in only 21 days. ***MR***

## NOTES

1. David McCullough, "Knowing History and Knowing Who We Are" (remarks at the Hillsdale College National Leadership Seminar on "American History and America's Future," Phoenix, Arizona, 15 February 2005), on-line at <www.hillsdale.edu/imprimis/2005/April/>, accessed 20 July 2005.
2. David Fraser, *Knight's Cross*: *A Life of Field Marshal Erwin Rommel* (New York: Harper Perennial, 1995), 300.
3. Ibid., 302-303.
4. Carl von Clausewitz, *War, Politics, and Power: Selections from On War, and I Believe and Profess*, trans. and ed., Edward M. Collins (Chicago: Gateway, 1962), 155.
5. Victor Davis Hanson, *An Autumn of War: What America Learned from September 11 and the War on Terrorism* (New York: Anchor Books, 2002), 124.
6. Clausewitz, 102.
7. Fraser, *Knight's Cross*, 273; Princeton historian Peter Paret observes in *Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age*, eds., Peter Paret and Gordon A. Craig (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1986), 137, that "[b]ecause Napoleon insisted not only on one-man rule but also on one-man command, the operational core of his staff was never more than an organization for assembling information he required and for transmitting reports and orders. The staff neither generated strategic plans nor developed an institutional capacity for independent decisionmaking within the context of his strategic and operational intentions."

We seem reluctant to learn from the Wehrmacht because they lost World War II, and the mentality is, obviously, that their methods were flawed. However, it is necessary to point out that the German general staff's sentiments were not original. The influence was Napoleonic in origin, which follows because Clausewitz greatly admired Napoleon. Although Napoleon was a scoundrel—his genius for combined arms warfare notwithstanding—the Generalstab, despite rejecting most Clausewitzian theory as the war progressed, was still heavily influenced by Clausewitz. (Excuse the paradox.)

8. Ibid. The Germans considered large staffs the invariable sign of a poor army.
9. Ibid.
10. Ibid.
11. Helmuth von Moltke, the Elder, expressed the sentiment "no plan survives contact." See Daniel J. Hughes, ed., *Moltke on the Art of War: Selected Writings*, trans., Hughes and Harry Bell (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1993).
12. Clausewitz, *On War*, trans. and ed., Michael Howard and Peter Paret (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1976), 100.
13. Peter Paret, "Napoleon and the Revolution in War," in *Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age*, ed., Peter Paret (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1986), 127.
14. Porter B. Williamson, *Patton's Principles for Life and Leadership* (New York: Touchstone, 1998).
15. U.S. Army Field Manual 101-5, *Command and Control for Commanders and Staffs* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, draft, 1997), H-73.
16. Earl F. Ziemke, *The U.S. Army in the Occupation of Germany 1944-1946*, Army Historical Series, U.S. Army in World War II (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, U.S. Army, 1990), 163; Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces (SHAEF) (44) 34, Operation Eclipse, Appreciation and Outline Plan, 10 November 1944, in SHAEF G-5, 115.25A, Jacket 3.

The reader should note the difference in length and content between U.S. Central Command's campaign plan for Iraq and the directives SHAEF published for the administration of occupied Germany. The tone and tenor are strikingly different. Also, SHAEF, while reluctant to take on the governance of postwar Germany, did not wish away pacification. By mid-1943, planners had been anxious to develop contingency plans for occupation. Planning for the occupation began in earnest before the Normandy landings. By the time Combined Chiefs of Staff Directive 551 arrived at SHAEF, which directed the military governance mission, SHAEF was ahead of the game. Contingency Plan Rankin was revised throughout the summer of 1944 and put into execution as Operation Eclipse on 8 May 1945. Policy lagged behind, however, as President Harry S. Truman did not sign Joint Chiefs of Staff Directive 1067 until 10 May 1945, after the document went through about eight revisions.

17. The Hamlet Evaluation Survey was initiated by American Aid Chief Robert Komer. His theory was that it was possible to rate every hamlet or village in Vietnam in terms of security, from A to E. Such ratings had little meaning in guerrilla warfare.
18. RADM Grace Hopper, in Hugh Nibley, "Leaders to Managers: The Fatal Shift" (speech given at the commencement ceremony, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah, 19 August 1983). On–line at <http://farms.byu.edu/display.php?table=transcripts&id=125>, accessed 20 July 2005.
19. Napoleon Bonaparte, *Napoleon on the Art of War*, trans. and ed., Jay Luvaas (New York: Touchstone, 1999), 61.
20. Nibley.
21. Ibid.
22. Ibid. Nibley's sentiment continues as follows: "The leader, for example, has a passion for equality. We think of great generals, from David and Alexander on down, as sharing their beans and matzah with their men, calling them by their first names, marching along with them in the heat, sleeping on the ground, and being the first over the wall. A famous ode by a long-suffering Greek soldier, Archilochus, reminds us that the men in the ranks are not fooled for an instant by the executive type who thinks he is a leader.

"For the manager, on the other hand, the idea of equality is repugnant and even counterproductive. Where promotion, perks, privilege, and power are the name of the game, awe and reverence for rank is everything—the inspiration and motivation of all good men. Where would management be without the inflexible paper processing, dress standards, attention to proper social, political, and religious affiliation, vigilant watch over habits and attitudes that gratify the stockholders and satisfy security?

"'If you love me,' said the greatest of all leaders, 'you will keep my commandments.' 'If you know what is good for you,' says the manager, 'you will keep *my* commandments and not make waves.' That is why the rise of management always marks the decline, alas, of culture."

23. Ibid. Nibley further observes that "[a]ll the great deposits of art, science, and literature from the past, on which all civilization has been nourished, come to us from a mere handful of leaders. For the qualities of leadership are the same in all fields, the leader being simply the one who sets the highest example; and to do that and open the way to greater light and knowledge, the leader must break the mold."
24. Gaius Julius Caesar, *The Gallic War*, trans., Carolyn Hammond (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 217, 8.44.
25. LTC Wally Z. Walters, "The Doctrinal Challenge of Winning the Peace Against Rogue States: How Lessons from Post-World War II Germany May Inform Operations Against Saddam Hussein's Iraq," U.S. Army War College Research Project, Carlisle, Pennsylvania, 2002, 19; Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces, *Handbook Governing Policy and Procedure for the Military Occupation of Germany* (December 1944).
26. Ziemke, 320; Forrest C. Pogue, in *The Supreme Command*, Army Historical Series, U.S. Army in World War II (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, United States Army, 1989), 357, notes that on 28 September 1944, General Dwight D. Eisenhower proclaimed: "The Allied Forces serving under my Command have now entered Germany. We come as conquerors, but not as oppressors. In the area of Germany occupied by the forces under my Command, we shall obliterate Nazism and German militarism. We shall overthrow the Nazi rule, dissolve the Nazi Party and abolish the cruel and oppressive and discriminatory laws and institutions which the party has created. We shall eradicate that German militarism which has so often disrupted the peace of the world. Military and party leaders, the Gestapo and others suspected of crimes and atrocities, will be tried, and if guilty, punished as they deserve." It is a shame such unequivocal statements are not forthcoming from today's military leaders regarding Iraq. Maybe the current quagmire might not exist if from the beginning we had called a spade a spade and acted accordingly.
27. Nibley.
28. Ibid.
29. Carlo D'Este, *Patton: A Genius for War* (New York: HarperCollins, 1995), xiii.
30. GEN Eric K. Shinseki, interview during "The Future of War," *Frontline* 1904KI, Public Broadcasting System, 24 October 2000. Shinseki's most telling comment was that "[t]he generals of the era just didn't get it." Indeed. And history has a funny way of repeating itself. The issue is not prognostication, preparation, being tradition bound, or even "fighting the last war." The issue is inspiration; where that inspiration is derived from; and what immortal feat it achieves. The mark of greatness is not to cloak action in historical parallel or justification, but to *act outside history*. Had Shinseki's medium brigades raced into Baghdad under his leadership, realizing destiny, then all glory to him. Instead, the 3d Infantry Division's tanks led the way in a fight similar to the last one, defying the wisdom of the men in this documentary. Another telling comment was that "we think we see better, but I'm not so sure. . . ." Indeed.
31. Clausewitz, *On War*, 78.

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